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liability for the year would not change.
The obvious question is whether the AMT credit12 would
provide any relief against the regular tax in future years.
The AMT credit
The credit for prior year minimum tax is designed to reduce
the regular tax liability by part or all of the AMT paid in
previous years.13  The credit can be carried forward
indefinitely to offset regular tax in future years; therefore, it
is not necessary to determine which prior year's minimum tax
credit is being used in a particular year.14 The minimum
credit cannot be carried back.15  The rules are different for
individuals (using Form 8801) and for corporations (using
Form 8827).16
Individuals.  The alternative minimum tax credit is limited
to the extent that regular tax liability (reduced by the other
nonrefundable credits) exceeds the tentative minimum tax for
the year.17  The prior year minimum tax credit for individuals
generally arises only in connection with deferral-type
preferences and adjustments.18  Exclusion-type adjustments
include—(1) the standard deduction, (2) personal
exemptions, (3) medical and dental expenses, (4)
miscellaneous itemized deductions and (5) interest expense.19
Real and personal property taxes and state, local and foreign
income, war profits and excess profits taxes are also in that
category20 unless allowable in computing adjusted gross
income.21  Exclusion-type preference items include depletion,
tax-exempt interest and gains from small business stock.22
“Adjusted minimum tax” is the net minimum tax reduced by
the amount that would have been the net minimum tax if only
the exclusion-type preferences and adjustments had been
considered.23
Corporations.  A corporation AMT credit is limited to the
amount the regular tax (reduced by the other credits) exceeds
25 percent of the excess of the corporation's regular tax over
$25,000.24  That limitation was added by the Tax Reform Act
of 1997.
Example:  The committee report contains an example of
married taxpayers, filing a joint return with—(1) no regular
taxable income, (2) deferral preferences in the amount of
$300,000 and (3) exclusion preferences (including disallowed
itemized deductions) of $240,000.  Under the 25 percent
alternative minimum tax rate and the $40,000 exemption
amount (which were in effect at that time), minimum tax
liability would total $125,000.  However, if the taxpayers had
only exclusion preferences, the minimum tax liability would
have been $50,000 (25 percent of $240,000 as reduced by the
$40,000 exemption).  Thus, the amount of minimum tax
available as a carryforward credit would be $75,000
($125,000 less $50,000).25
In conclusion
Unless and until changed by Congress, those using income
averaging will need to watch closely to see if AMT
diminishes or eliminates the benefits from the averaging
election.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
FEDERAL TAXATION     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtors filed a previous Chapter 13 case in
August 1990 and the IRS filed claims for unpaid taxes for 1987,
1988 and 1989. The Chapter 13 plan provided for payment of the
taxes but the debtor failed to fully pay the tax claims before the
case was dismissed in October 1994. The current case was filed in
January 1995 and the IRS again filed its claim for the 1987
through 1989 taxes. The debtors argued that the tax claims were
no longer entitled to a priority because the taxes were due more
than three years before the petition was filed. The IRS argued, as
several courts have held, that the three year period of Section
523(a)(2) was tolled during the first bankruptcy case. The court,
however, held that the statute provided no authority for any
tolling of the three year period. Instead, the court held that the
Bankruptcy Court could give the tax claims priority based on the
court’s equity power under Section 105 and remanded the case
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for a determination of the equities of allowing the tax claims to
retain priority because of the previous bankruptcy case. In re
Morgan, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,712 (11th Cir. 1999).
After losing a Tax Court case which held that the debtor owed
taxes, the debtor married his long-time companion and executed
an antenuptial agreement which transferred all of the assets of a
corporation owned by the debtor to the debtor’s spouse’s
corporation. In return, the spouse transferred to the debtor debts
owed to her by the debtor. Neither set of assets had much value
because the debtor’s corporation had been incurring substantial
losses. However, because the debtor’s corporation owned the
debtor’s residence and vehicles, the antenuptial agreement
effectively removed from the debtor’s estate all assets against
which the IRS could levy to satisfy the Tax Court judgment. The
IRS petitioned for nondischarge of the debtor on the tax claims
for willful and fraudulent attempt to evade taxes. The court held
that the tax debt was nondischargeable because the intentional
and voluntary transfer of the debtor’s assets without adequate
consideration to a family member was a willful and fraudulent
attempt to evade taxes. On appeal, the appellate court reversed,
holding that, under In e Haas, 48 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 1994), the
mere non-payment of taxes did not amount to a willful attempt to
evade taxes under Section 523(a)(1)(C). The court expressed
reservations about the wisdom of Haas under the facts of this
case but felt compelled to follow Haas. In re Griffith, 99-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,749 (11th Cir. 1999), rev’g, 210 B.R. 216
(S.D. Fla. 1997), aff’g, 161 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
POST-PETITION TAXES . The debtor filed for Chapter 11 in
October 1995 but did not make the election to bifurcate the 1995
tax year as of the petition date. The debtor’s plan provided for
payment of the 1995 taxes and a lien securing the payments. The
IRS had notice of the plan but did not object, and the plan was
confirmed. The IRS then attempted to levy for collection of the
1995 taxes and the debtor filed a motion to enjoin the levy as
violating the plan. The court held that the IRS could levy for the
taxes because (1) the failure of the debtor to elect to bifurcate the
1995 tax year made the 1995 taxes post-petition taxes and a
personal liability of the debtor, (2) the taxes were
nondischargeable, and (3) the Anti-Injunction Act prohibited
judicial interference with the levy. In re Wood, 99-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,730 (C.D. Calif. 1999).
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The Chapter 7 trustee sold the
debtor’s residence. The court held that the bankruptcy estate was
entitled to exclude the gain on the sale under the I.R.C. § 121
exemption for sale of a personal residence. In r  Williams, 99-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,738 (Bankr. D. Md. 1999); In re
Slye, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,739 (Bankr. D. Md.
1999); In re Curran, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,742
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1999).
The IRS has now conceded the issue. Chief Counsel Notice
(35)-000-162, Aug. 10, 1999.
TAX LIEN . The IRS filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien and
Levy on an administrator of a retirement plan in which the debtor
owned an interest. Before the levy was executed by the
administrator, the debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The IRS
filed a claim in the bankruptcy case and the Bankruptcy Court
approved the sale of all assets to the debtor, free and clear of all
liens. The retirement plan was not excluded or exempted from the
bankruptcy estate by the debtor. The debtor then received a
discharge without objection from the IRS. The IRS also did not
appeal the discharge. The IRS ruled that the discharge ruling was
re  judicata as to the taxes discharged and the tax lien did not
attach to the debtor’s interest in the retirement plan post-
discharge. Ltr. Rul. 9929005, March 25, 1999.
CONTRACTS
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS. The plaintiffs were
grain farmers who entered into cash forward contracts which
contained provisions for rolling over the delivery date of the
contract. The contracts were made with the defendant elevator
which had sufficient facilities to take delivery. The plaintiff
sought to avoid enforcement of the contracts by arguing that the
contracts were off-exchange futures contracts which violated the
Commodity Exchange Act. The court found that the front of each
contract was a standard cash forward contract which called for
actual delivery of a crop sold by the producer to the defendant
elevator.  The backs of the contracts contained similar provisions
which allowed either party to request and approve rolling over the
delivery date to the next crop year upon agreement of both
parties. The court held that the rollover provisions did not convert
the contracts into illegal, off-exchange futures contracts. Barz v.
Geneva Elevator Co., 12 F. Supp.2d 943 (N.D. Iowa 1998).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has adopted as final
regulations amending the Catastrophic Risk Protection (CAT)
endorsement regulations to (1) delete the provisions regarding the
termination of the policy for failure to pay CAT administrative
fees since those provisions have been incorporated into the Basic
Provisions; (2) specify that the administrative fee for CAT
coverage for each crop in the county will be $10 plus the greater
of either $50 or 10 percent of the premium under the CAT policy;
and (3) revise the date CAT fees will be due to coincide with
when the premium is due for additional coverage. This last rule
eliminates all references to refunding administrative fees in the
event that the producer decided to change coverage levels prior to
the sales closing date since fees would not have been paid. Also,
this rule makes the provisions concerning the payment of
administrative fees in the year of application consistent with the
payment of administrative fees for limited coverage. This rule
eliminates the termination provisions since they have been
incorporated into the Basic Provisions. 64 Fed. Reg. 40738 (July
28, 1999).
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM. The FCA has issued final
regulations on the release of information under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) to reflect new fees and make it easier for
the public to get FCA records; revise the procedures for requests
for testimony by FCA employees on official matters and for
producing FCA documents in litigation when FCA is not a named
party; and add procedures for getting records in public
rulemaking files. 64 Fed. Reg. 41770 (Aug. 2, 1999).
MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL LABOR.  The plaintiffs were
migrant farm laborers hired by a farm labor contractor who was
hired by the defendant to provide pickers to harvest snap beans in
three crop years. In the first two years, the farm labor contractor
was properly registered but in the third year the registration was
not obtained and the contractor failed to obtain health and
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accident insurance. The plaintiffs were injured in a truck accident
while being transported to the defendant’s fields. Also included as
defendants were a bean processor and its president who
purchased the bean crop under a contract with the defendant
farmer. The plaintiffs sought to hold all of the defendants liable
for their injuries because the defendants were joint employers
with the labor contractor and for failing to require the labor
contractor to certify registration under the MSAWPA. The trial
court jury had found that the farmer was liable for failing to check
the labor contractor’s MSAWPA registration but awarded only
statutory damages of $350 per plaintiff because the farmer’s
failure to check registration was too far removed from the cause
of the injury. The court examined the seven factors of the
regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 500.20, and case law to hold  that the
farmer was liable as a joint employer of the plaintiffs with the
labor contractor because the plaintiffs were economically
dependent upon the farmer: (1) the farmer exercised indirect
control over the plaintiffs work, (2) the plaintiffs did not require
much training for the work for the farmer, (3) the plaintiffs’ work
was integral to the farmer’s business, and (4) the work was
performed on the farmer’s land.   The processing company and its
president were held not to be joint employers because there was
no evidence of involvement with the plaintiffs’ employment. The
court also reversed on the issue of the farmer’s liability for actual
damages for the plaintiffs’ injuries, holding that the farmer’s
failure to insure that the labor contractor was properly registered
under the MSAWPA caused the plaintiffs to not have access to
insurance which would have been required for the registration.
Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999).
The plaintiffs were hired by the defendant to harvest tobacco on
the defendant’s farm and filed suit for violations of MSAWPA by
the defendant, including transportation of the plaintiffs on a
tobacco harvester. One plaintiff was injured from a fall from the
harvester while the plaintiffs were being transported on a
highway between fields. The defendant sought summary
judgment based on arguments that (1) the plaintiffs were not
migrant workers under the Act because the plaintiffs lived in
Georgia and did not have to stay away from their residence over
night, (2) the defendant was exempt from the act as a family farm
business, (3) the defendant was exempt from the act as a small
business, and (4) the transportation of workers on a harvester is
exempt from the motor vehicle safety provisions of the Act. The
court found that the plaintiffs’ residence was in Florida because
that was where the plaintiffs returned each winter and stored all
their furniture; therefore, the plaintiffs were migrant workers
when they worked for the defendant in Georgia. In addition, one
plaintiff was a nonresident alien and the Act defines a nonresident
alien’s residence as the alien’s country of origin. The court held
that the defendant was not eligible for the family farm exemption
because the defendant did not perform all of the farm labor
contracting activities. The court held that summary judgment
could not be granted on the small business exemption because the
defendant had not submitted sufficient information as to the
defendant’s employment of migrant labor in the past year. The
court held that the transportation of the workers on a harvester on
the highway was subject to the motor vehicle safety standards
because the transportation was not incidental to the workers’ jobs
of harvesting tobacco. The court restricted this exemption to
transportation on the harvester while the workers were harvesting
crop in the field. Soto v. McClean, 20 F. Supp.2d 901 (E.D.
N.C. 1998).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESS DEDUCTION . Legislation
has been introduced in the U.S. Senate which would increase the
FOBD from $1.3 million to $2.6 million. Sen. 1413, 106th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS . The decedent
owned a life interest in a trust established prior to 1985. The trust
provided the decedent with the testamentary power to appoint
trust corpus and the decedent’s will appointed the trust property
to the decedent’s grandchildren. The court held that the exercise
of the power of appointment did not subject the trust to GSTT
because the power was exercised under the trust provisions which
became irrevocable before September 25, 1985.  Simpson v.
United States, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,351 (8th Cir.
1999), rev’g, 17 F. Supp. 2d 972 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX . The
decedent owned interests in a corporation which owned and
leased various commercial properties. The corporation provided
significant maintenance and other business services for most of
the properties but one property was leased only for advertising.
The IRS ruled that the decedent’s interests in the corporation
qualified as a trade or business for installment payment of estate
tax purposes except for the property leased for advertising. Ltr.
Rul. 9929025, April 26, 1999.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT . The decedent was the sole
trustee of a trust established by the decedent’s predeceased
parent. The trust beneficiaries were the decedent’s children and
the trust was established to hold the stock in two family
corporations in order to maintain the family ownership and
continuation of the corporations. The trust authorized the trustee
to amend the trust in whole or part. The IRS examined state law
and the intent of the grantor and ruled that the decedent did not
have a general power of appointment over trust corpus because
the decedent could not amend the trust to distribute trust corpus to
the decedent, the decedent’s estate or the decedent’s creditors.
The trust also provided that the trustee could control the
distributions of trust income to the trustee’s children, but not the
children of the trustee’s siblings. The IRS ruled that this power
did not amount to a power of appointment, even while the
children were minors, because the decedent’s fiduciary duty
prohibited the use of trust funds to satisfy the decedent’s legal
obligation to support the children. FSA Ltr. Rul. 9930026, April
26, 1999.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
CAPITAL GAIN . The IRS has issued proposed regulations
which provide that, for purposes of applying section 1(h)(7)(B)
(which provides that a taxpayer's unrecaptured section 1250 gain
cannot exceed the taxpayer's net section 1231 gain), gain from the
sale of a partnership interest that results in section 1250 capital
gain is not treated as section 1231 gain even if section 1231 could
apply to the disposition of the underlying partnership property.
The IRS noted that, although section 1(h)(7) (in combination with
section 751) applies a limited look-through rule for purposes of
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determining the capital gain rate applicable to the sale of a
partnership interest, no similar look-through rule applies for
purposes of applying section 1231. 64 Fed. Reg. 43117 (Aug. 9,
1999), adding Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1223-3.
COMMODITY FUTURES . The taxpayers donated
commodity futures to a charity. The transaction was subject to
I.R.C. § 1256 which required the taxpayers to mark the futures to
market and realize gain upon the transfer to the charity. The
taxpayers argued that I.R.C. § 1256(a)(2) provided an exception
where the donor does not receive any actual proceeds from the
donation. The court held that I.R.C. § 1256(a)(2) did not provide
an exception for donations to charity but only protected the donor
against taxation for any subsequently realized gain. Therefore, the
taxpayers realize gain from the donation of the commodity
futures to the charity. Greene v. United States, 99-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,701 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’g 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,291 (S.D. N.Y. 1998).
CONSTRUCTIVE PAYMENT . The taxpayer was a family-
owned corporation which reported income and deductions on the
accrual method. The taxpayer claimed a deduction for
compensation accrued but not paid to family members. The
taxpayer agreed that it should have used the cash basis method of
reporting but argued that the compensation was still deductible
prior to payment because the employees could have withdrawn
the compensation in the tax year in which the wages were
deducted. The court held that, although there was a doctrine of
constructive receipt of compensation, there was no authority for
allowing a deduction for constructive payments. In addition, the
court noted that there was no need for such a rule where the
employer and employee were both cash basis taxpayers. Unico
Sales & Marketing, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-242.
CORPORATIONS
PURCHASE OF STOCK. The IRS has issued proposed
regulations relating to the allocation of purchase price in deemed
and actual asset acquisitions under I.R.C. § 338. The proposed
regulations determine the amount realized and the amount of
basis allocated to each asset transferred in a deemed or actual
asset acquisition and affect transactions reported on either Form
8023 or Form 8594. 6  Fed. Reg. 43461 (Aug. 10, 1999).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS . The taxpayers
were employees of a large corporation which instituted a
downsizing program which included incentives for employees to
terminate employment voluntarily. The company established a
general release agreement and determined the termination
payment. The taxpayers stipulated that, prior to signing the
general release and covenant not to sue, they had not experienced
any symptoms of personal injury, including any physical or
emotional harm; had not asserted or threatened any claim against
the employer for personal injury, including any physical or
emotional harm; and had not communicated with the company
regarding any personal injuries or claims for personal injury,
including any physical or emotional harm. The company withheld
employment taxes from the release payments. The taxpayers
withheld a portion of the payments as settlement of tort or tort-
like ADEA claims. The taxpayers argued that the company had
anticipated that some of the employment terminations could lead
to lawsuits; therefore, a portion of the release payments should be
considered as paid in settlement of potential tort claims from the
terminated employees. The court held that the payment  were
included in the taxpayers’ incomes because no tort claims were
ever made or settled by individual negotiations. Abrahamsen  v.
Unit d States, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶ 50,697 (Fed. Cls. 1999).
DEPRECIATION . The taxpayer purchased a used bus and
converted the bus to a motor home over two tax years. The
axpayer made significant improvements to the bus in the
conversion but did not claim any depreciation deductions for the
bus based on the costs of the improvements. The bus was found
to be 5-year property for depreciation purposes and in the fifth
y ar after placing the bus in service, the bus was destroyed by a
fire. The taxpayer received insurance proceeds for the
replacem nt cost of the bus but did not claim any gain from
receipt f the proceeds. The court held that the basis of the bus in
the year of loss was the total amounts expended on the bus and
improvements less the amount of depreciation allowable over the
first four years; therefore, the taxpayer recognized gain to the
extent the insurance proceeds exceeded the basis. Montoya v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-269.
Legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Senate which would
reduce from 24 months to 12 months the capital gains holding
period f r horses. Sen. 1409, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. 1999.
The IRS has issued a correction to its 1998 instructions for
For  4562, Depreciation and Amortization, and Publication 527,
Resi ential Rental Property, regarding the classification of certain
personal property used in rental real estate activity, such as
ppliances, furniture and carpeting. The correct classification
sh uld have been five-year property rather than seven- year
property. Further, the correct recovery period for the regular tax is
five years under the General Depreciation System and nine years
und r the Alternative Depreciation System. Also, when using a
five-year recovery period for this property for the regular tax, any
alternative minimum tax adjustment must be figured using a nine-
year recovery period. However, if the property was placed into
service after 1998, the same recovery period applies for both the
regular tax and the AMT. Ann. 99-82, I.R.B. 1999-__.
Pursuant to the directive in the Tax and Trade Relief Extension
Act f 1998 (Pub. L. No. 105-277), the Treasury Department is
conducting a comprehensive study of the recovery periods and
depr ciation methods under I.R.C. § 168 that must be sent to the
House Ways and Means Committee and to the Senate Finance
Committee no later than March 31, 2000. The public has been
invit  to submit comments regarding the determination of
depr ciation recovery periods and methods. The Treasury's Office
of Tax Analysis will review and consider all comments and other
inform ti  received in response to this notice in preparing its
study. Notice 99-34, I.R.B. 1999-__.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayers purchased a
farm which was enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP). The taxpayers had to apply to the USDA to take over the
participation in the CRP from the previous owners and the USDA
ruled th t the taxpayers were actively engaged in the business of
f rming. The IRS, however, assessed tax deficiencies based on
disallowance of deductions for farm expenses because the
taxpayers were not engaged in farming for a profit. The taxpayers
eventually won their appeal on that issue and sought litigation
fees from the IRS because the IRS position was not substantially
justified. The taxpayers argued that the USDA finding was
binding on the IRS. The court held that the USDA finding was
based on different criteria from those used by the IRS. The court
noted that the taxpayers had not supplied the IRS with sufficient
information to make a full determination early and that factual
issues remained through most of the appeal process. The appellate
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court affirmed in a decision designated as not for publication.
Hasbrouck v. Comm’r, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,731
(9th Cir. 1999), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1998-249.
The taxpayer was employed as a medical doctor and also
operated a horse breeding activity. The court held that the horse
breeding activity was not engaged in for profit under the nine
factors of Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b): (1) the business records were
not accurately maintained to reflect business and personal costs;
(2) the taxpayer had no written business plan to make the activity
profitable; (3) the taxpayer had little expertise in operating a
breeding business, although the taxpayer had some expertise in
breeding, and the taxpayer did not consult business experts except
for tax professionals; (4) most of the taxpayer’s time spent on the
activity was devoted to the more enjoyable activities, with the
most onerous activities hired out; (5) the taxpayer failed to show
that the assets would appreciate sufficiently to create a profit; (6)
the activity had losses for all six years and the taxpayers could not
reasonably project further profits; (7) the taxpayer had income
from other sources which was offset by the breeding activity
losses; and (8) the taxpayer derived considerable personal
pleasure from the taxpayer’s participation in the activity. Hillman
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-255.
ORIGINIAL ISSUE DISCOUNT . The IRS has announced
that the original issue discount (OID) tables that appear in
Publication 1212, List of Original Issue Discount Instruments,
will no longer be available electronically from the IRS bulletin
board (IRS-BBS) in Martinsburg, WV, after October 1999.
Beginning in November 1999, the tables can be accessed on the
IRS Internet web site at www.irs.ustreas.gov. Ann. 99-71, I.R.B.
1999-31, 219.
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES . The taxpayers owned a
condominium unit which was rented to third parties when the
taxpayers were not using it for vacation purposes. The unit was
managed by a third party which charged the taxpayers 45 percent
of the revenue from the rentals. The evidence showed that the
taxpayers spent less than 100 hours per year in managing the
renting of the unit; therefore, the court held that the losses from
the unit were passive activity losses. Rapp v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1999-249.
The taxpayer operated a car rental business which had tax
losses. The deductions of the losses were disallowed under I.R.C.
§ 469 as passive rental losses. The taxpayer argued that the
allowance of $25,000 of passive losses from real property rental
activity violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The court held that the
distinction between real property rental passive losses, up to
$25,000, and personal property rental passive losses was
constitutional because it had a rational basis in Congressional
intent to help small real estate investors who invested in rental
real estate for non-tax purposes. Sch tzer v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1999-252.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM  § 7.03.*
SALE OF PARTNERSHIP INTEREST.The IRS has issued
proposed regulations which provide rules relating to the
allocation of a divided holding period with respect to an interest
in a partnership. These rules generally provide that the holding
period of a partnership interest will be divided if a partner
acquires portions of an interest at different times or if an interest
is acquired in a single transaction that gives rise to different
holding periods under section 1223. The holding period of a
portion of a partnership interest shall be determined based on a
fraction that is equal to the fair market value of the portion of the
partnership interest to which the holding period relates
(determined immediately after the acquisition) over the fair
market value of the entire partnership interest. A selling partner
may use th  actual holding period of the portion of a partnership
inter st sold if the partnership is a “publicly traded partnership”
(as defined under section 7704(b)), the partnership interest is
divided in o identifiable units with ascertainable holding periods,
and the selling partner can identify the portion of the interest
transferred. Otherwise, the holding period(s) of the transferred
interest must be divided in the same ratio as the holding period(s)
of the partner's entire partnership interest. 64 Fed. Reg. 43117
(Aug. 9, 1999), amending Treas. Reg. § 1.741-1(e), (f).
PREPRODUCTIVE PERIOD EXPENSES . The taxpayer, a
partnership, planted nine month old fig trees in December of one
year and January of the next year. Some of the trees produced
sellable fruit in August of the third year and the rest did not
produ e fruit until after the third year. The taxpayer argued that
some of he fig trees had a preproductive period of less than two
years because sellable fruit was produced within two tax years
after planting. The IRS disagreed, ruling that the preproductive
period started with the propagation of the fig trees and includes
the period before the tree is transplanted in the orchard. Secondly,
the IRS ruled that the preproductive period is measured in
calendar days and not in whole tax years; therefore, because the
trees required more than two calendar years to produce
marketable crops, the preproductive period exceeded two years.
Third, the IRS ruled that the preproductive period ended only
when the harvested crop was sufficiently large to generate enough
revenue to offset the production costs and contribute enough
revenue to the business to sustain the farming business. Finally,
the IRS ruled that the preproductive period of fig trees exceeded
two years because the USDA provided information that the
national weighted average preproductive period for all fig trees
xceeded two years. Therefore, the reproductive period expenses
ssociated with the fig trees had to be capitalized in the trees. Ltr.
Rul. 9929001, April 6, 1999.
PROFESSIONAL FEES . The taxpayer was a trustee and
beneficiary of a trust which became irrevocable and funded upon
t e dea h of the grantor. One of the grantor’s heirs filed a suit to
challenge the validity of the trust, alleging incompetence of the
deceden  when the trust was established and undue influence by
other heirs. The taxpayer defended the trust in the law suit and
incurred legal expenses in successfully preserving the trust as
valid. T  taxpayer deducted the professional fees incurred as
bu iness expenses of the trust. The court held that the
professional fees had to be capitalized in the basis of the trust
ass t  because the fees were incurred in a suit involving the rights
of the taxpayer in the property and not in a suit challenging the
administration of the trust. Stevens v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1999-259.
RETURNS. The IRS has published revised Instructions for
Form 706-A (Revised August 1999), United States Additional
Estate Tax Return. This document is available at no charge and
can be obtained either: (1) by calling the IRS's toll-free telephone
number, 1-800-829-3676; (2) at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/;
(3) through FedWorld on the Internet; or (4) by directly accessing
the Internal Revenue Information Services bulletin board at (703)
321-8020.
The IRS has issued temporary and final regulations that  allow
income tax return preparers to elect an alternative to their social
Agricultural Law Digest 127
security number (SSN) for purposes of identifying themselves on
returns they prepare. 64 Fed. Reg. 43910 (Aug. 12, 1999).
The IRS has issued a revenue procedure that sets forth
specifications governing the submission of 1999 Forms 1098,
1099, 5498 and W-2G electronically or on magnetic tape, tape
cartridge or diskette for the 1999 tax year and for information
returns for years prior to 1999 that are required to be filed. These
specifications must be used to prepare current and prior year
information returns filed beginning Jan. 1, 2000, and received by
the IRS's Martinsburg Computing Center (IRS/MCC) or
postmarked by Dec. 15, 2000. Rev. Proc. 99-29 I.R.B. 1999-__.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ELECTION. The taxpayers were shareholders in a corporation.
The taxpayers claimed a share of the corporation’s losses on their
individual returns, based on the argument that a proper
Subchapter S election was made for the corporation. However,
the taxpayers had no written evidence of a mailing of Form 2553
and the IRS had no record of receiving the form. Therefore, the
court held that no S corporation election was in effect and
disallowed the loss deduction. Barber v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1999-260.
NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDERS. Legislation has been
introduced in the U.S. Senate which would consider all members
of a family as one shareholder for S corporation purposes and
would allow nonresident aliens to be shareholders. The legislation
would also allow debt to be converted to stock and allow S
corporations to issue preferred stock. Sen. 1415, 106th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1999.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. This case involves law prior to
passage of the exclusion of gain on the sale of a residence. The
taxpayer received a residence as part of a divorce decree and sold
the residence. The taxpayer failed to purchase a replacement
residence within two years but also failed to report the gain from
the previous sale of the residence. The taxpayer argued that the
recognition of the gain should have occurred because the taxpayer
was prevented from purchasing a second residence by the actions
of the taxpayer’s former spouse. The court held that no exception
existed for  the actions of third parties and held that the gain had
to be included in the taxpayer’s income. Stilz v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1999-245.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME . The taxpayers were
husband and wife and for many years both contributed labor to
their farming operation. Some of the farm land was owned by the
wife in her own name and was rented to the husband, with the
wife continuing to provide services to the husband’s farming
operation under an agreement which provided compensation to
the wife. The compensation was reported as wage income to the
wife and was deducted as labor expense by the husband The
taxpayers excluded the rental payments made by the husband to
the wife from self-employment income of the wife. The court
held that the rental income was included in self-employment
income of the wife because the leasing of the land was made
“under an arrangement” which included material participation of
the landlord in the raising of agricultural commodities on the
land.  The case follows Mizell v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-571.
Bot v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-256.
TAX LIENS . The taxpayer owed income taxes when the
taxpayer became a beneficiary of a decedent’s estate. After the
taxpayer became a beneficiary, the IRS had filed a Notice of
Federal Tax Lien. The IRS argued that the tax lien attached to the
taxpayer’s interest in the decedent’s estate. The taxpayer,
however, disclaimed any interest in the estate and argued that the
disclaimer prevented the attachment of the tax lien. The court
held that state law controlled the issue of whether the taxpayer
had any property interest in the estate to which the lien could
attach. The court held that Colorado law provided that an estate
beneficiary did not have an interest in a decedent’s estate until the
beneficiary affirmatively accepted the bequest and that a
beneficiary could disclaim an interest in the estate; therefore, the
taxpayer’s disclaimer prevented attachment of the tax lien.
Davidson v. United States, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,696
(D. Colo. 1999).
TAX PROTESTORS . The taxpayer filed a “common-law lien”
against the property of an IRS revenue agent who was involved in
collecting unpaid taxes owed by the taxpayer. In a ruling
designat d as not for publication, the court invalidated the lien
because the taxpayer failed to show that the agent owed any debt
to the taxpayer and ordered the taxpayer to show cause why a
$2,000 fine should not be imposed for filing a frivolous appeal of
th  invali ation of the lien by the District Court. United States v.
Scott, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,745 (7th Cir. 1999).
THEFT LOSS. The taxpayer’s home was burglarized and a 12
inch bronze statue was stolen. The statue was a gift in 1972 but
the valu  of the statue was unknown to the taxpayer. The taxpayer
nev r ha  the statue appraised or specifically identified as a
casting made by the sculptor as compared to a copy made by third
parties which was far less valuable. The taxpayer claimed a theft
lo s deduction for the value of the statue as an original. The court
disallowed most of the deduction, setting the value at much less,
based on two recorded sales of similar statues, because the
taxpayer failed to provide sufficient proof that the statue was an
artist’s casting. Vitale v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-272.
WATER LAW
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT . The plaintiff owned land
neighboring land leased by the defendant. A canal existed on the
plaintiff’s land which carried water to the defendant’s and other
neighbors’ lands for over 40 years. The plaintiff took various
actions which diverted water from the canal, eventually damaging
the canal. The defendant installed a 10 inch PVC pipe on the
plaintiff’s property to replace the canal and the plaintiff brought
this action in trespass for damages. The defendant claimed a
prescriptive easement over the land where the pipe and canal
existed. The trail court found that the defendant had proved the
elements of a prescriptive easement. The plaintiff argued that the
use of the land was permissive because the involved landowners
had acted “neighborly” in regulating the water use. The court held
that the use of the land for the canal was not permissive because
the plaintiff failed to show that permission to use the land was
ever sought or granted from the landowner. The court noted that
cooperation between the  neighbors did not amount to permission.
The plaintiff also claimed that the installation of the PVC pipe
was beyond the scope of the easement and was- an unreasonable
use of the easement. The court held that the change in conveyance
of the water was allowed where the change improved the water
usage as to conservation. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305
(Utah 1998).
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4th Annual
SEMINAR IN PARADISE
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 24-28, 2000
Royal Lahaina Resort, Kaanapali Beach, Island of Maui, Hawai’i
Celebrate the Millenium by leaving winter behind and spending a week in Hawai'i in January 2000! Balmy
trade winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand Kaanapali beach and the rest of paradise can be yours;
plus a world-class seminar on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl and Prof. Roger A.
McEowen.  The seminar is scheduled for January 24-28, 2000 at the spectacular ocean-front Royal Lahaina
Resort on the island of Maui, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each day, Monday through Friday, with plenty of time to
golf, play tennis or just lie in the warm Hawaian sun. A continental breakfast and break refreshments for
each day are included in the registration fee,  Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 500 page
seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials which will be updated just prior
to the seminar. A CD-ROM version will also be available for a small additional charge.
     Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business
deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize
tax over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden”
gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales,
private annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living trusts and medicaid trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and
limited liability companies.
Early registration is important to obtain the lowest airfares and insure availability of convenient flights at
a busy travel time of the year. Attendees are eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the Royal
Lahaina Resort, the site of the seminar.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural
Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law. The registration fee for nonsubscribers is $695.
Subscribers should receive their brochure soon. Look for it in your mail.
Call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958 or e-mail: aglaw@aol.com, if you need a brochure for this seminar.
Also, see our web site for details and registration forms:  http://members.aol.com/aglaw/agpub
